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An 'object' is what gets in the way, a problem thrown in your path like a projectile
(coming as it does from the Latin objectum, Greek problema) ... I come across
obstacles in my path (come across the objective, substantial, problematic world); I
overturn some of these obstacles (transform them into objects of use, into culture) in
order to continue; and the objects thus overturned prove to be obstacles in
themselves. The more I continue, the more I am obstructed by objects of use ...
Vilern Flusser 'Design: Obstacle for/to the Removal of Obstacles'[
How will things end? With things. The world, modern apocalyptic tones sing,
will seize up with a surfeit of stuff. An unending stream of products will
finish it all off, jamming the workings of the life-flow: a cataclysmic deluge
leading to an irreparable breakdown.
Where do all these things come from? From designers, but why? Why do
designers keep making things? Why do we keep making designers make
more things?
How is it that things just seem to build up in our households? And then in
storage spaces that we rent to keep all the things we do not need on a daily
basis? Almost imperceptibly, things accumulate. One day we find to our
surprise that we have three of the same thing: one old but still working; one
not so old but not working; one new but difficult to make work. Or else: one
that does one thing; one that does that same thing and something else that
we never need; and another that can do that thing and many others if only we
knew how. How did we get into this situation? Why are there so many
variations of the same thing? Why is it someone's job, someone's specialist
expertise to search for new things to make, to find inadequacies with some
existing thing as a weak premise for designing yet another version of that
thing? Why is it a novel subcultural phenomenon when 'downshifters' take life-
changing actions to reduce the number of things they have? Why is it
profoundly challenging when sustainability policy innovators talk of reducing
the number of things we need to own by promoting systems of shared-use?
In fact, the real issue in regard to the unsustainability of our households is not
just the number of things in them (and our rented storage adjuncts) at anyone
time. It is less our standing stock than our throughputs. It is the number of
things that pass through our households over time, the linear flow from raw
materials to junk of near zero-life products, to use Walter Stahels'
terminology. The unsustainable rate of flow in this 'river economy' results
less from increasing amounts of disposables like packaging, than the
increasing percentages of things we treat as disposables. Semi-durables slide
toward single-use, and durables toward semi-disposables. In most of these
cases, we are passing on for storage in land-fill not broken, but just redundant
things. How is this possible? How is that we spend so little time with things we
invest so much in purchasing? How can we without conscience relegate such
sophisticated technical materials and devices to abandonment? What are
these things that designers design, these things that we desire only to dispose
of, these things that seem to disappear the moment they arrive?
actively relating to things
Yet the tragedy is that in the moment homo faber seems to have found fulfilment in
terms of his own activity, he begins to degrade the world of things, the end and end
product of his own mind and hands; if man the user is the highest end, 'the measure
of all things,' then not only nature, treated by homo faber as the almost 'worthless
material' upon which to work, but 'valuable' things themselves have become mere
means, losing thereby their own intrinsic 'value'
Hannah Arendt The Human Condition[5]
Thankfully, sociologists are beginning to develop more sophisticated accounts
of our relations to the stuff we have derelict about us. Until recently,
sociologists were their own worst enemies, borrowing impoverished concepts
like 'consumers' from culturally vacuous disciplines like economics to explain
'thing accumulation and flows'. The results were laments about the
inevitability of consumerism ('it's human nature to be addicted to novelty'; 'it's
the essence of social relations to consume conspicuously'; 'it's the structure of
capitalism to amass material property'), when in fact this determinism was
only the consequence of such stereotyping.
Instead, recognition is now emerging that everyday life involves a wide variety
of purchase, use and disposition processes; some are psychological, some
social, some functional; many involve tacitly negotiated combinations of all
these domains; nearly all are structured by the particularities of a range of
meso-level activities, tasks that are not dissociable from various interrelated
products. If things multiply through our households, this has less to do with
spectacular moments of consumerism than our many and varied everyday
habits: preparing food, entertaining ourselves with or without others, getting to
and from people and places, clothing ourselves cleanly for different contexts. I
am thinking for example of analyses of 'unconscious consumption' like
Elizabeth Shove's Comfort, Cleanliness and Convenience: The Social
Organization of Normality. Her first survey chapter is a critique of
consumption sociology and sustainability research to date for
overemphasising and isolating "moments of acquisition rather than the
consequent adjustment of what people do. [Her question is instead] So how
does the stuff and substance of consumption relate to the ordering of
everyday life and to concepts of normal and proper practice?" .(14) Her
response is to invoke actor network theory to explain the shifting historical co-
configurations of users and their products into distinct patterns of use and
disposition.
It is in the context of these recent activity-based accounts of our 'thing
relations' that the following was developed. In negotiating things as pragmata,
"things insofar as we have to do with them at all, whether we work on them,
use them, transform them, or we only look at and examine them, these
accounts have not only surpassed the inadequacies of consumer analyses,
but they have also opened up better understandings of the relation of design
to the unsustainability of our stocks and flows of stuff.
Mostly without knowing it, these accounts of the everyday purchase, use,
neglect and disposal of things derive from the phenomenology of lived
practice initiated by Martin Heidegger's existential analytic. Things in that
account are first of all networked equipment manifesting only within the 'in-
order-to' of certain activities. However, whilst these recent more praxeological
accounts of household consumption take up a Heideggerian perspective,
there is level to which they are yet to proceed. Without moving to that level,
which probably means explicitly negotiating their Heideggerian heritage, what
these analyses have to say does not add up. Their case studies of the
plurality of everyday thing relations do not yet go to answering the questions
with which I began, about the net volume of things that our houses hold for
more or less time. So what follows is an attempt to outline what an analysis at
that level entails. It is an attempt to explicate the thingliness of the things
designed for us to use each day. It tries to show how that thingliness makes
possible, and even necessary, things made for long lives yet limited use,
things that can therefore accumulate, whether in our houses or in landfills,
without us even caring.
mis-taking things
In the hierarchy of things from which I just cited, Heidegger asserts that
pragmata is second last to methemete. This more fundamental level of
thinking about things is crucial, Heidegger believes, for understanding the
state of things in our world today. His 1935-6 lecture course on The Question
Concerning the Thing[8] argues that Kant completes a shift, effected in large
part by Newtonian physics, in the meaning of the mathematical that
essentially moves things from the realm of the qualitative to the quantitative.
Eytmologically, the mathematical refers not to numbers and the algebraic or
geometric, but rather to "things insofar as we learn them" (71) or rather "things
insofar as we take cognizance of them as what we already know them to be in
advance" (73) Things can only be encountered as things if there is prior
characterisation of them as some sort of thing. "The mathematical is that
evident aspect of things within which we are always already moving and
according to which we experience them as things at all, and as such things.
The mathematical is the fundamental position we take toward things by which
we take up things as already given to us, and as they should be given.
Therefore, the mathematical is the fundamental presupposition of the
knowledge of things." (75)
So the mathematical is the fore-understanding by which things come to be the
things we experience them as. If things are experienced pragmatically, as
being(s)-of-use, this way of being a thing derives from a particular
'mathematics' of things. According to Heidegger, this is in fact the original
Greek mathematics of things. Whilst we today still do live with things within
this mathematics, this is not how we explicitly think about things. Modern
things by contrast are distanced from practical experience. They are instead
taken to be mere manifestations of abstract systems of physics and
chemistry. We moderns, after Galileo, Newton, Descartes and Kant,
'experience' things as so many substitutable examples of certain properties
and relations. Ancient anticipatory learning has become modern projective
instruction, "a project (Entwurf) of thingness which, as it were, skips over
things ... a basic blueprint [that] at the same time provides the measure for
laying out of the realm, which, in the future, will encompass all things of that
sort" (96) Engagement with particular things through practical
understanding of their distinct qualities is thereby replaced by designed
calculations of numbers of things. To be crude, customised thingly relations
are replaced by mass production.
This account of the changing mathematics of things is an elaboration of the
account in Being and Time of the shift from praxis to theoria, from 'how-to'-
based concern with the ready-to-hand to 'what is' observatory operations on
the present-at-hand.] t And, in nascent form, this account of the changing
mathematics of things links also to Heidegger's later critique of technology
where, beneath the imperialism of instrumental reason, things lose their
engaged specificity and are instead quantified as mere means to
unquestioned ends.
However, this last linkage is too quick a paraphrase of Heidegger's critical
account of the technological metaphysic. It is a misinterpretation that glosses
over precisely the issue of things. It suggests that the accumulation and flows
of things through our households is the result of instrumentalism. Pure
instrumentalism though should, in all efficiency, aim to involve no things at all.
According to this understanding of Heidegger's critique, as we become more
enthralled by technology we should become literally more metaphysical. We
should have less and less to do with material things as we become more
concerned with the modern sense of the mathematical: the digital,
information, systems. But instead we find the opposite. We find the paradox
that Ezio Manzini has noted that the more involved we are with the immaterial,
the more material things accumulate as junk about us. A merely
instrumentalist understanding of technology cannot explain this incessant
materialisation.
This mistaken version of Heidegger is particularly pertinent at this moment
when sustainability researchers have begun promoting the design of
sustainable service-systems as a strategy for lowering the material intensities
of our societies.! These service-systems aim to deliver functional results
with the minimum material inputs over time. Whilst to a na'ive Heideggerian
these service-systems might appear to be worrying exemplars of
technological Gestell, the dangerous enframing of all beings within sheer
functionality, the immediate outcome of such an enframing, according to such
a reading, should indeed be dematerialisation. Being-in-the-world could,
according to this inadequate understanding of Heidegger, through service-
system design, become a thing less process, a situation in which things
become completely efficient substrates satisfying changing human wills.
However, with a more thorough understanding of Heidegger, particularly of
the fact that Heidegger's critique of technology emerges from his account of
thingliness, functional innovations through service-systems can be read as
one of those predictions - like those of the coming service society,
information revolution, knowledge economy, or post-materialist values - that
will be buried beneath so much stuff.
To put this another way, if the abridged Heidegger-on-technology account is
too broad - and in fact not dissimilar to the stereotyping of consumerism -
and yet the pluralist pragmatic account of everyday consumption activities too
narrow, what lies between is in fact design. The metnemete that structure our
pragmata result not only in chtemeie "things insofar as they are in use and
therefore stand at our constant disposal", but also poioumene, "things insofar
as they are produced by the human hand and stand as such." (70) And it is
within the ontology of making, the techne of poiesis that a certain meihemete
takes place that accounts for things as they accumulate and flow
unsustainably today. But to access this, poioumene must be compared with
the last (or in fact first) category of things, phusike.
finishing things off
The work of our hands, as distinguished from the labour of our bodies ... fabricates
the sheer unending variety of things whose sum total constitutes human artifice. They
are mostly, but not exclusively, objects for use and they possess the durability Lock
needed for the establishment of property ... It is this durability which gives the things
of this world their relative independence from me who produced and use them, their
'objectivity' which makes them withstand, 'stand against' and endure, at least for a
time, the voracious needs and wants of their living makers and users.
Hannah Arendt The Human Condition [13]
Martin Heidegger's 1939 essay "On the essence and concept of Phusis in
Aristotle's Physics B 1"[1 is helpful in this matter. Heidegger's essay aims to
recover a sense of kinesis or 'moved ness' as the essence of all being.
Most radically, Heidegger tries to demonstrate that, in terms of phusis: all
things are in motion, especially those concrete everyday things which we
moderns think are 'at rest':
But are bedsteads and garments, shields and houses moving things? Indeed
they are, but usually we encounter them in the kind of movement that typifies
things at rest and therefore is hard to perceive. Their 'rest' has the character
of having-been-completed, having-been-produced, and, on the basis of these
determinations, as standing 'there' and lying present before. Today we easily
overlook this special kind of rest and so too the moved ness that corresponds
to it, or at least, we do not take it essentially enough as the proper and
distinguishing characteristic of the being of these beings. And why? Because
under the spell of our modern way of being, we are addicted to thinking of
beings as objects and allowing the being of beings to be exhausted in the
objectivity of the object. (192)
To reveal this 'movedness', Heidegger is at pains to refuse the common
misinterpretation of Aristotle, that the difference between philsis and techne is
that between the autopoietic and the allopoietic. What we today call 'nature' is
not that which makes itself, as opposed to everything else which is the
product of human making, i.e. the 'artefactual', because phusis is in no way a
form of making. The difference lies not in who or what does the making, but
between the completed product of making and what just is.
Now, in typical Heidegger fashion, this distinction is the opposite of what it at
first seems. In terms of movedness, the previous quotation indicated that
things that are a result of poiesis or (human) making, e.g., bedsteads and the
like, are at rest. They lie present (are pre-sent), finished. By contrast, phusical
things just are, but in a way that manifests a dynamic presence (a
presencing). Far from being cast as something permanently present, philsis
must be understood as always already in formation; at anyone time phusical
things are capable of being some things and resisting being others; at every
moment they are becoming and withdrawing (at the same time, i.e. becoming
X by withdrawing from being V).
Heidegger notes that to 'lead the way toward' this sense of being phusically,
Aristotle invented a term: entelecheie. Heidegger translates this term as
'holding techei; itself (en) in its end (te/os)' (217). Again, meaning the opposite
of the way it is immediately read, entelecheie designates not that which has
reached its end, as if its end were different from what it has, up until that time,
been, but that which is, at all times in its becoming, what it is and aims to be.
With this term, a clear distinction can now be drawn between the outcomes of
techne and phusis.
A table is not a table until it is finished. It is not what it aims to be (its te/os)
until it is completed (by a maker, erctie, who also happens to lie outside it, but
this is merely contingent, not axial to what differentiates phusical and
technical things). When it is done, when the making is over, the table (as
opposed to the phusical wood - this is the whole point, so I will come back to
this) has no becoming but instead is finished. It is (at) an end; it is 'finishedly'.
This is very different to a tree, which is never over and done with. It is always
still on-the-move. However, though forever 'on the way', it is nevertheless
always also what it aims to be. Though never completed, the tree is at every
moment complete as a tree. Even when a sapling, a seedling, or a seed, and
also when rotting wood, it is never (at) an end, but rather has its end as and in
what it is. Where techne aims to finish (making) something, philsis
involves things being sustained, that is, the maintenance of things, in their
changing ness, continuing their change, or their continuance by changing
themselves.
disposing of what is taken for granted
Commercial competition has pushed forward the most rapid employment of these
possibilities [of the fluidification of matter], leading to the multiplicationof images and
services offered and to the accelerated introductionof the 'new'. At the same time,
the lack of a design culture capable of confronting these new technological
possibilities has resulted in the disseminationof worthless products. So the potential
of the old technology is distributed in the banal forms of gadgets, disposable
products, and ephemeral objects lacking any cultural significance.A feeling of
generalized transcience, an impoverishmentof sensory experience, of superficiality
and the loss of relationswith objects derives from this; we tend to perceive a
disposable world: a world of objectswithout depth that leaves no trace in our
memories, but does leave a growing mountain of refuse.
Ezio Manzini "Prometheusof the Everyday"[
Heidegger's efforts at recovering the Aristotlean sense of phOsis are
undertaken out of a fear that we moderns are losing our ability to affirm the
movedness of that which is in a state of becoming. A productivism, that is, a
propensity to see everything as technical, as if it had all been produced (i.e.
the product of a Creator), casts things into certain (Platonic) metaphysics of
presentness. The danger in mis-seeing everything about us as only products
is that every thing is then mis-taken as being finished, as completely static.
We stop seeing things in motion, or motion in all things, and instead see only
objects. What is problematic is less seeing everything as a mere means, than
seeing everything as an end; or rather, things can only be exploited as mere
means if they appear to have no inherent process of their own, if their
becoming is thought to have ended. These products are reduced to being just
what they are, that is, just how they are now, in the present.
This then is why Heidegger must remind us of the in-time-ness of being. As
the technical producer of things, humans seem to let all that they encounter
lapse into being merely beings, things just present, as if outside time. These
'out-of-time' things tend to be merely present things, not impressively there,
shining forth in their thereness at the moments when they are here. This is
because their not-always-having-been- and not-always-will-be-hereness is
also not being noticed; the way these things are only whiling here, their
phusical coming-to-be and unbecoming, is not acknowledged as being also
there along with them. To this extent, produced things, as finished, as merely
present, lose their having-been-produced-ness. They are alienated from their
production and reified as sheer stuff. In other words, it is in the very nature of
production that production erases itself by its outcome. The result of poiesis
are things that deny their poietic nature. As such, as just present things, now
here as if from nowhere, these things become constantly present, there at
hand, to be added or multiplied as so much maths, to accumulate or flow
without anybody taking care of them.
There is then a transition in the nature of things accomplished by techne:[1
- from "the real [Wirk/iche] [as] the working, the worked [Wirkende,
Gewirkte]; that which brings hither and brings forth into presencing, and that
which has brought forth and brought hither ... the presencing, consummated in
itself ... ente/echeia" (160)
- to the real as "that which results from an operatio ... that which follows out
of and follows upon an actio,: the consequence, the out-come [Er-fo/g] .. , that
which follows in fact and ... is the factual [Tatsachliche]" (161-2)[20J
- then to "the real now show[ing] itself as object, that which stands over
against [Gegen-Stand] ... We shall now name the kind of presence belonging
to that which presences that appears in the modern age as object:
objectness" (162-3) I}
- and finally, "Objectness changes into the constancy of the standing-
reserve, a constancy determined from out of Enframing [a reference to
Heidegger's famous 'The Question Concerning Technology']" (173).
In another essay from the same period
'constancy' via Rilke:
Heidegger explains this
The objectiveness [Gegenstandige] of the world becomes constant [standig] in
representational production ... In this, it is true, there is another transformation of
things into the inward and invisible. However, this transformation substitutes for the
frailty of things the factitious constructions of calculated objects. These objects are
produced for consumption. The more quickly they are consumed, the more
necessary it becomes to replace them ever more quickly and easily. That which is
enduring about the presence of objective things is not their resting-in-themselves in
their own world. What is constant about things produced as mere objects of
consumption is the substitute [Ersatz].
I have cited extensively here because it is crucial to see the particular way in
which the technical making of things leads both to the permanent
materialisation of things and to the unceasing generation of things of only
passing significance. It is the very finishedness of modern-(un)made things,
the way they are cast out into the world as from then on unchanging, that, far
from granting them long lives, destines them to be a never finished stream of
short use-life objects requiring mathematical systems of collection, storage
and disposal. They can be cycled through in a relay of never complete means
only because they are technical end(ing)s. In this context, consumerism does
not drive manufacturing, rather manufacturing drives consumption; not in the
sense that the machinery of capitalism forces us to consume its products
(through advertising for example, or design), but in the sense that making
complete things (like the design of any product), making things whose
thingliness lies in their completeness, in their being finished objects, leads to
things of no particular lasting value. For the same reason, it is not the
abstraction of mathematics, the calculative worldview of modern science, that
strews our world with stuff; rather, it is the project of making things end that
makes possible an abstractly quantitative way of dealing with all that results;
theoretical science is a consequence of seeing things as inert products.
sustaining things while presenced
We are beginning to become conscious of the temporal nature of all forms (and thus
of all creation). Since entropy is beginning to obstruct us at least as much as objects
of use are. The question of responsibility and freedom (this being the essential
question of creation) arises not only in the process of designing but also in the
process of throwing away objects of use. It may be that consciousness of the
temporality of all creation (even that of immaterial designs) will contribute to a future
situation in which things will be designed a bit more responsibly, resulting in a culture
with less and less room for objects of use to act as obstacles and more and more
room for them to serve as vehicles for interpersonal contact.
Vilem Flusser 'Design: Obstacle for/to the Removal of Obstacles'[23]
Now, all this is how things are treated, but it is not how they are. As Heidegger
famously revealed in Being and Time, we are constantly surprised by things
not being constantly there for us. We only notice things' being, and the being
of poiournena as having-been-produced, when they break down. At these
times, products re-assert their being-in-time, withdrawing phusically from the
technical system into which they have been requisitioned. I say phusically
because these moments that defy the finishedness of things manifest the
materiality of things - or more, precisely, manifest things as alive, as matter-
in-motion, energised, entelechially underway.
This has frustrating consequences for our no-time-out economy, but our
anguish on these occasions evidences the extent to which we expect and
depend upon products being unchangingly perfect. If we were Presocratics,
we would, according to Heidegger, consider such wear and tear thenorm
rather than the exception; we would live in the awareness that it is the nature
of all things to egress, evade and elude, rather than stay put, no matter how
technologically sophisticated we get.[24] And in fact, if we were Ancient
Greeks, so tolerant would we be of this withdrawal of things that we would
consider products of poiesis to be merely at rest, not unmoving, merely
whiling in a particular presence, rather than permanently present; finished in a
particular way, but in no way entirely complete, or wholly at an end.
In short, to be Greek about things would mean actively sustaining things,
paying respect to the things we have brought to presence with and for us, by
preserving them while they are here. Exactly as modern overemphases of
products' permanence means that that things are ignored, neglected, stored
in places we never go or accelerated through our households as quickly as
possible, so ancient awareness of products' impermanence means spending
time with things, maintaining and repairing them, sustaining them.
We are now in a position to see why this engagement with Heidegger on
things is significant. Only a consideration of the mathematical level of things
as finished products explains both how consumerism is possible and why it is
unsustainable. Consumerism emerges as a fundamental inability to sustain
things. It is a refusal to acknowledge that artificial things remain natural to the
extent that they are within time, aging. It is refusal to see that making does not
make things permanent, but only ever holds things as particular sorts of things
for particular periods of time. It is arefusal that cannot not leave refuse in its
wake.
Further, only such a thingly account of our societies can explain why the
things we use in our changing everyday activities increasingly take the
paradoxical form of disposable durables. Without considering the
mathematics of made things, one could expect that that things would conform
to the activities for which they are used, changing when the activity changed,
or being changeable, that is, maintainable and repairable, when the activity
stayed the same. With a consideration of the mathematics of made things it is
understandable why there should be such a mismatch between service-life of
materials and components and actual product use-lives, why 'planned
obsolescence' can be a design strategy in a way that 'waste management' or
'refurbishment, remanufacturing, recovery' never can. Plastic for example,
that quintessential disposable durable can now be explained as the perfect
technical product.
All this now also fits with several points about contemporary approaches to
sustainability that were mentioned in passing at the outset:
Firstly, our unsustainable contemporary notion of things makes predictable
that post-industrial societies would be characterised not by the replacement of
things but rather the mere displacement of things. The production of things
could not just end but was bound to rebound, finding more ways to 'continue
thinging completely'.
Secondly, this is why the unsustainability of things lies in both the stock of
things in each of our households and the flow of things through those
households. Stocking and flowing are the same thing if things are never-
ending ends.
Thirdly, and most pertinently for the context of this issue of DPP, PSS
(product service systems) design will be another thing to get rid of unless it is
explicitly an engagement with the timing of things. This means that PSS
design must focus on what is being categorised as 'product-oriented services',
services that aim to extend and/or intensify the use-life of things. To put
this in terms of households, given that shortening product use lives are one of
the most unsustainable things about our everyday lives, our materials
intensity can be reduced by slowing the throughput of things, by making
things last longer. Given that increased material inputs to a product are one of
the most direct ways of enhancing durability, this means that, given
sufficiently designed product life extension, rematerialisation can be a
dematerialisation strategy. From the mathematico-philosophic point of view of
this article, the most directly unsustainable thing about our households is the
throughput of disposable durables, and so the only appropriate strategy
consequently is the re-thing-ification of things, that is to say, the re-
temporalisation of things.
servicing imperfectly moving things
In the very moment in which technological innovation affects a loss of many limits to
our possibilities, society has begun to realize that other limits we had not previously
recognized exist. The 'discovery' of environmental limitations and their implications is
certainly another
aspect that characterizes the current historical phase and requires a profound
reconsideration of the meaning that we have thus far given to the verbs design and
produce ... One passes from a 'culture of doing as production' to one of 'doing as
reproduction.' It concerns moving toward a production culture in which human activity
has as its primary objective the regeneration of the conditions that permit, and will
continue to permit, the continuation of existence.
Ezio Manzini "Prometheus of the Everyday"[26]
Heidegger's Aristotelian brief awaiting designers in the age of a surfeit of stuff
is then clear. Design timely things, things that can last longer by being able to
change over time. Design things that are not finished, things that can keep on
by keeping on being repaired and altered, things in motion.
Importantly, this is a different brief to the perennial exhortations for quality
design. Calls for product-life extension by design have echoed throughout the
twentieth century from the Werkbund, through Vance Packard and the
Committee for Terotechnology, to EternallyYours.[27] In many ways each of
these, and many others, was advocating still, or even more so, perfect things
[per-ficere: to bring to an end]. The cliche of the design classic signals exactly
that its objective is an ahistorical, timeless product. The contemporary, purely
technical version of this mathematics aims at the unchanging through nano-
technology - the self-repairing, self-altering, self-reproducing. (Plastic;
artificial intelligence; nuclear energy; how many of these promethean
moments must we continue to fail to learn from?)
By contrast, the Heideggerian brief is for the imperfect product, the product
that must be continuously improved, the product that is always still under
development, a work in progress. Or more precisely, product-plus: product
plus a process that takes responsibility for the fact that the product in its
present manifestation, in its materiality, is not the be-all-and-end-all, but must
be actively sustained. As indicated in the previous section, this is a PSS, but
one that exists to enhance rather than distance things.
An instructive version of this kind of brief was provided by Abraham Moles in
the late '80s (in English), before the discourse of sustainability was
established. Moles was not writing from a Heideggerian context of course, but
instead responding to hopes of a coming post-industrial society with the
uncharacteristic realisation that "Any immaterial civilization will be heavily
materialized because its immaterial products are necessarily linked to the
mechanical infrastructure that generates, stabilizes and governs them".
Moles recognized that "The immaterial civilization must be reliable" (27), and
that that reliability comes not from creating "new' objects' (31) but from
"amaintenance mentality" (26).
In another article, Moles concretizes what this poietic mathematics would
entail with a proposal for "The Comprehensive Guarantee"[30]: that all bills of
sale be accompanied by a contract ensuring not only full repair whenever
needed but also compensation for inconvenience and loss of product use
time. Prescient of current arguments about 'extended producer responsibility',
Moles foresaw that such a performance contract would reflect back upon the
design process. Designing products for servicized use-life extension means
"tak[ing] into account the micropsychological analysis of the object/user
binome and deduc[ing] from each aspect of this interaction not only the
conditions in which the object will fulfil what was traditionally called its
function, but also the conditions of its permanence [my italics] with respect to
the role it is to play in the life of the user" (64). The task for designers then
according to Moles is to design the sustainment of what they design; to design
not just some thing, but also the conditions through which that thing has a
presence over time as a thing; that is to say, to design how a thing things.
overcoming product fixation
The look, eidos, and the form, morphe, each encloses within itself that which belongs
to a thing. As enclosing, it constitutes the limiting boundary of what determines the
thing as finished, complete. The look, as enclosing the belongingness of all the real
determinations is also conceived of as constituting the finished ness, the
completeness, of a being.
Heidegger The Basic Problems of Phenomenology
I would like to end with the question of whether designers are fundamentally
capable of negotiating this brief.
What is at issue is not whether designers are capable of designing nothings
rather than things, that is to say, services rather than products, but rather
whether designers are capable of designing things that are not finished. It is
less a matter of designing a different sort of thing than a matter of a
thoroughly different form of designing, one that is perhaps better described as
form of 'continuous design' or 'redesigning'
There is at first the psychological obstacle to this imperfectionism. Nuri Bilgin,
in an article upon which Moles relies for much of what he advocates in relation
to the 'comprehensive guarantee', points out that maintenance tends to work
against certain psychological theories that argue that "any motivation toward
completing a task engenders tension, which is usually relaxed only when the
task has been accomplished. Now, since prevention is carried out without
perceptible stimuli and without a direct goal, this state of tension persists, and
the preventive action may bring about permanent frustration. In other
words, would designers find satisfying enough the production of incomplete
products to complete the process of designing, creatively? There are then the
anthropological obstacles surrounding homo faber. From a Marxist
perspective, the essence of being human is to externalize oneself through
material production; without an alienated object as outcome, humans are
reduced to animality without identity.
But more pertinent to this article is the ontology of designing. If designing is
making par excellence, the project of pre-determin(at)ing what is to be made
present, what can be considered actually complete when that form is
materialized, then designing is mathematical in the modern sense through
and through. A designing that could generate other sorts of changing things,
things other than blueprinted ends, would no longer be a form a de-signing.
So perhaps it is time that we finished designing.
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